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Alisa L. Carse
The things we typically do value include things that we cannot 
singlehandedly either create or sustain (our own life, health, reputation, 
our offspring and their well-being, as well as intrinsically shared goods 
such as conversation, its written equivalent, theater and other forms of 
play, chamber music, market exchange, political life, and so on). We 
must allow many other people to get into positions where they can, 
if they choose, injure what we care about, since those are the same 
positions that they must be in, in order to help us take care of what we 
care about (Baier, 1994a: 101).
 We need to trust others in order to survive and thrive. Sometimes those in 
whom we place trust are strangers we’ll never know—the subway mechanic, the 
county arborist, the person in the back office where our loved one took a job; 
sometimes they are nearer and dearer to us—a neighbor, doctor, teacher, parent 
or friend. We need to assume, in a general sort of way, that the brakes will work, 
the trees won’t fall on our house after the storm, our loved ones will be safe from 
cruelty or abuse. We also need to trust that we will be cared for competently, 
taught responsibly, treated fairly, and loved well. In these and many other ways, 
trust is a vital good. Yet trust can be fragile and is often unwise. How, then, are 
we to understand this necessary, but risky good?
 In everyday discourse we don’t use the word “trust” consistently. We say, for 
example, that we ‘trust’ that the sun will be out by noon, that the umbrella will 
hold up in the wind, that the dog is friendly. We are delighted to find a plumber 
we ‘trust’ and grateful our family ‘trusts’ us. We worry about the ‘trustworthiness’ 
of the judicial system, the metro, and our banks. While there are points of 
commonality among these diverse forms of trust, my discussion here concerns trust 
between people rather than ‘trust’ in nature, things, animals or institutions.2 And 
I will focus, in particular, on trust between people in relationships of dependency 
and inter-dependency.
 Our dependency on others can vary in intensity and scope; it can play a role 
in our relationships with strangers, intimates, or everything in between; it can 
configure relatively short-lived or long-term relationships, as well as single or 
repeated interactions. Characteristically, our dependency relationships involve 
inequalities of knowledge, expertise, need or power, so that one party is in some 
respect especially dependent on, and vulnerable to, the other. Contexts of dramatic 
asymmetrical dependency can seem most urgent in thinking about trust because 
of the special susceptibility of dependents to injury, neglect, and abandonment. 
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Yet we need only think of trust’s role in romantic love, friendships between peers, 
or collegial partnerships to appreciate the full scope of its vital importance. Trust 
in all contexts carries both risk of harm and possibility of benefit. In trusting 
others, we allow them “to get into positions where they can, if they choose, injure 
what we care about since those are the same positions that they must be in, in 
order to help us take care of what we care about” (Baier, 1994a: 101).
 Are therefeatures different cases of trust share in virtue of which they are 
cases of trust? How, if at all, can trust’s role in our interactions with the plumber 
compare to its role in romantic love? There is no single right answer to this 
question. It matters what work we want our account of trust to do, what questions 
we hope it can help illuminate. Here I seek an understanding of trust that can 
help us think critically and reflectively about dependency relationships and their 
moral risks.
Trust as a three-place predicate
In her influential essay, “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Annette Baier proposes we 
represent “trust” as a three-place predicate, formulated schematically as A 
entrusts B with valued [good] C (1994a). Offering elaboration, Baier states that “a 
relationship of trust [is] one where A has entrusted B with some of the care of C 
and where B has some discretionary powers in caring for C”. “Caring for C” is 
to be given a broad interpretation – to include everything from “show concern 
for [C]” to “leaving [C] alone” (1994a, 101-2). Baier recognizes that this schematic 
representation “will involve some distortion and regimentation of some cases” 
(Ibid.). Most importantly, the language of “entrustment” risks reinforcing the 
mistaken idea that to trust is to entrust something to another, rather than, for 
example, entrusting another with ‘non-things’ like secrets, plans, or the care of 
one’s children. Moreover, we can trust others to do something—take out the dog 
before work or recommend a good doctor; or to be a certain way (e.g., attentive, 
honest, conscientious). Thus the language of “entrusting” can be awkward. But 
a three-place model seems right to me, and permutations of it prevail in recent 
literature on trust.3 I’ll adopt it here, using the language of ‘trusting’ rather than 
‘entrusting’.
 Crucially for us, Baier’s three-place formulation captures the fact that trust 
is relative to a domain. The domain can be wide or narrow. We might trust a 
friend as a confidante (in general) or we might trust her with a particular secret; 
we might trust someone with the wellbeing of our children, or trust them with 
our children’s teeth. We say sometimes we that we trust someone “absolutely”– 
as if in all domains – but what we tend to mean is something more like, I trust 
her to have integrity and moral virtue, but no! I wouldn’t let her near my car or 
my tomato plants. The scope of trust is often implicit.
3
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 There is no question that just as the domain or scope of trust can vary, 
so too our trust can be more or less secure or wary, sturdy or fragile. If we are 
fortunate, we will experience contexts in our lives of calm, easy trust, unburdened 
by concerns about risk. When we experience no cause for uneasiness or anxiety 
about others’ trustworthiness, the issue of trust may not be one we grapple with 
consciously or explicitly. Of course, “calm, easy trust” can be naïve, unwise, even 
foolish. And when trust is betrayed, the stakes are often high.
Trust versus (Mere) Reliance
It is common in current philosophical work on trust to distinguish trusting, 
properly understood, from (merely) ‘relying on’. We rely on others for a great 
deal that we cannot do ourselves or alone, sometimes without an expectation 
that they will come through for us and sometimes, even, with the expectation 
that they won’t. You’re working late and you’re relying on your neighbor to pick 
up the kids, but you can’t reach her and you’re not sure she remembers; the 
transformer explodes during the hurricane, and you’re relying on someone from 
the electric company to fix it, even though you expect that, like last time, they’ll 
botch the job. In this sense, ‘rely on’ essentially means something like ‘depend 
on—for better or for worse,’ sometimes because we have no choice.
 There is a second, different sense of ‘rely on’ (or ‘reliance’), which conveys 
the confident expectation that those relied on will do what they are relied on 
to do. It is this second sense of ‘rely on’ that we will focus on here in thinking 
about trust. Many writing on trust agree that it is a form or “species” of reliance 
in this second sense—that is, reliance grounded in relatively confident predictive 
expectations about what another or others will do. Trust, it is then further 
maintained, is to be regarded as a form of reliance, grounded in “normative” as 
well as predictive expectations.4 In this sense, to trust is, broadly, to hold certain 
normative expectations of another (e.g., that he tell the truth, take good care of 
the dog, remember your birthday) and to expect (predictively) that he will meet 
them. Disagreement lies in how we might best understand the nature and role of 
normative expectations constitutive of trust (as opposed to mere reliance). I want 
here to examine several contrasting accounts of the reliance/trust distinction 
and key points of disagreement among them. I will focus primarily on the work 
of Annette Baier (1994a, 1994b), Karen Jones (1996) and Margaret Walker 
(2006), whose influential views on trust will set a framework for some of my own 
thoughts about how we might see this distinction and – more specifically – how 
we might understand a kind of robustly moral trust important in dependency 
relationships.
4
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Trust and Goodwill
In “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Baier proposes that in trusting, we rely on others’ 
“goodwill,” rather than merely on their “dependable habits,” or their “dependably 
exhibited fear … or other motives compatible with ill will [and indifference] toward 
[us]” (1994a, 98-9). We can rely on others, Baier says, even when we don’t (or 
don’t any longer) trust them—as when, for example, we have evidence that it is in 
their self-interest to behave as needed: “We may rely on the shopkeeper’s concern 
for his profits to motivate him to take effective precautions against poisoners” 
(1994a, 99); “[w]e put our bodily safety into the hands of pilots, drivers, and 
doctors with scarcely any sense of recklessness” (1994a, 98). If our reliance is 
based in a confident expectation that those relied on will come through for us, 
if only from a desire for profit, fear of sanctions, concern for their reputation, 
and the like, our reliance can be reasonable, but it is not yet trust (1994a, 126; 
1994b). In trusting, we rely on others to do as they should, and to do so with 
the right motivation—that is, with “goodwill.” Trust can be “betrayed…and not 
just disappointed” (1994a, 99).
 Belief in another’s “goodwill” does not, of course, suffice in grounding 
trust. When we hop into a cab, we hope that the cabbie has goodwill – that he 
won’t overcharge us, drive us to a remote area and rob us, or stop to chat with a 
friend, oblivious to the ticking meter. But we also hope he is a competent driver 
with a good sense of direction. A dentist whose knowledge is dated and skills 
rusty might be dangerous, however great his goodwill. Thus it is a “belief in the 
trusted’s goodwill and competence” that “grounds the willingness to be or remain 
within the trusted’s power in a way the distrustful are not, and to give the trusted 
discretionary powers in matters of concern to us” (1994b: 133, my emphasis).
 It is apparent in thinking about examples, that the competence expected in 
trusting isn’t always or only a form of specialized skill or knowledge. Sometimes 
it is normative competence. Consider Baier’s example: “[T]he babysitter who 
decides that the nursery would be improved if painted purple and sets to work 
to transform it, will have acted, as a babysitter, in an untrustworthy way, however 
great his goodwill” (Baier, 1994a, 101). In misjudging the scope of what he is 
trusted to, the babysitter has taken inappropriate initiative in the nursery. He may 
be well-meaning and skilled, his choice of purple lovely, but he has exercised poor 
judgment as a babysitter. He has failed to understand the normative expectations 
of him, the nature and limits of the responsibilities and freedoms of this role.
 A central piece of Baier’s account of trust is the need, in trusting, to give 
discretionary latitude and “power” to the trusted party with confidence they will 
not abuse or mismanage it. When we trust, we rely on others to understand what 
it is we are trusting them to do and to make good judgments in doing it (1994a, 
101). Consider our relationships with health care providers, which are paradigmatic 
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in this sense. They are configured by dramatic inequality of knowledge and 
vulnerability—they tend to be asymmetrical dependency relationships, initiated 
out of need imposed by illness or injury. They standardly require the patient 
to grant a significant degree of discretionary latitude and power to physicians, 
nurses, and other professionals. Even in cases in which the risk of dependency 
can be reduced and we have some control in reducing it (when you need a doctor, 
you try to find one highly recommended), there is an unavoidable element of 
dependency and its attendant vulnerability. You’ve done your research, chosen a 
reputable surgeon, and now you’re heading into the operating room on a gurney. 
 Though the kind of discretionary latitude and power we give those we trust 
can vary greatly across contexts, it is a key source of risk. We cannot predict all 
the contingencies in yielding control to someone else and the simple truth is 
that we are often, in trusting, not in a position to monitor whether and how our 
trust is being fulfilled.
 Crucially, for Baier, the normative expectations characteristic of trust concern 
both what we expect another will do and their motivation for doing it. These 
expectations are based in our beliefs about the other’s goodwill and competence. 
When we trust, we accept our vulnerability to those we trust, relaxing our oversight. 
Trust can, of course, admit of degrees, but, it entails a degree of confidence in 
the trusted other that is incompatible with wariness and anxiety about their 
trustworthiness. “Trust,” Baier writes, “is an alternative to vigilance and reliance 
on the threat of sanctions, trustworthiness an alternative to constant watching to 
see what one can and cannot get away with, to recurrent recalculations of costs 
and benefits” (1994b, 133). 
Trust and the Affective Attitude of Optimism
In “Trust as an Affective Attitude” (1996), Karen Jones follows Baier in giving a 
central role in trusting to confidence in the trusted’s goodwill and competence.5 
At the same time, Jones rejects the emphasis Baier places on the truster’s beliefs 
about the trusted as a basis for trust. She defends a conception of trust on which 
it is “most centrally” an “affective attitude of optimism about the goodwill and 
competence of another as it extends to the domain of our interaction [with 
them]” (11).
 As an affective attitude of optimism, trust does not consist in a bald “yay!” 
attitude toward the prospect of another’s goodwill and competence. Trust is 
complex. It involves beliefs and forms of reasoning, but it also powerfully shapes 
what we regard as evidence in believing and reasoning as we do: “Trusting,” Jones 
writes, “functions analogously to blinkered vision: it shields from view a whole 
range of interpretations about the motives of another and restricts the inferences 
we will make about [their] likely actions … for it gives rise to selective interpretation, 
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which means that one can be fooled, that the truth might lie, as it were, outside 
one’s gaze… we impute honorable motives to those we trust, and typically do 
not even stop to consider the harms they might cause” (12). Jones offers what 
I would call a dynamic view of trust, for trust as she understands it consists in a 
practical and perceptual stance that shapes what we notice, the interpretation 
we give what we notice, and hence the way in which we think and reason about 
others. What we believe about others, in turn, informs and fortifies our trust 
in them: “If I trust you, I will, for example, believe that you are innocent of the 
hideous crime with which you are charged, and will suppose that the apparently 
mounting evidence of your guilt can be explained in some way compatible with 
your innocence. Of course the resistance to evidence is not limitless: given enough 
evidence, my trust can be shaken and I can come to believe that you are guilty. 
I will come to see you in quite a different light”(1996, 16).
 One consequence of Jones’s view is that the evidentiary basis for reasonable 
trust is less stringent and demanding than it is for rational expectation and 
prediction more generally (17). This is true of distrust as well. Even if you regularly 
commute on the metro, news of a mishap on your metro line due to conductor 
error may switch your default expectation that metro conductors are trustworthy, 
reversing it to the default expectation that they are not. This expectation may 
then “seek out evidence for [itself]” and be to some extent “self-confirming”. 
You might, for example, be acutely aware that your conductor looks sleepy, or is 
chatting while the train is in motion. Beliefs grounded in distrust are, like those 
grounded in trust, “ abnormally resistant to evidence,” as is the optimism (or 
pessimism) grounded in them (20).
 While trust most centrally consists in an attitude of optimism regarding 
the goodwill and competence of another, this alone does not suffice. A second 
essential element of trust, Jones claims, is “the confident expectation that, when 
the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the 
thought that you are counting on her” (6). This expectation distinguishes trust 
from mere reliance: If you believe I will meet your expectations because I am 
anxious that you’ll seek violent vengeance on me if I don’t, then you reasonably 
believe that my direct motivation is anxiety about payback, and the thought that 
you are counting on me at best indirect and secondary (9). This second element 
of trust helps also to distinguish blanket optimism we might have in someone’s 
goodwill from optimism we have in trusting someone in a specific domain (9). 
If you anticipate that a particular cosmetic surgeon views plastic surgery on 
adolescents unfavorably, this surgeon is unlikely to be one to whom you entrust 
your fourteen year old’s nose job, however confident you are in her overall 
goodwill.
 This is not to say that in trusting you I expect the fact of my trust to trump 
any and all other considerations you might have in acting; I can perhaps grant 
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that other considerations may be decisive for you in the end. But it does entail 
confidence that you will not dismiss or disregard the fact that I’m counting 
on you in favor of “just any other concern” (9). Moreover, in trusting, we are 
also confident that another’s interests in fulfilling our trust are not primarily 
instrumental ones, keyed to her own interests, and hence merely contingently 
connected to our own. This suffices in some cases of reliance, but not in cases 
of trust, properly understood.
Trust and Strawson’s Participant Stance
In “Damages to Trust” (2006), Margaret Walker rejects the view that trust entails 
confident expectation regarding the goodwill of those we trust: “[T]he idea that 
trust requires you to respond to my reliance on you out of good will towards 
[me], rather than for other reasons that are reliably motivating, asks too much” 
(76).6 Walker also rejects Jones’s assertion that trusting entails an expectation 
that the trusted party will be moved “directly and favorably by the thought that 
you are counting on her.” While this characterization of trust fits relationships 
“among individuals who are directly aware of each other” it “doesn’t translate 
well to our reliance on those countless persons, ‘seen and unseen,’ upon whom 
we indiscriminately and mostly unthinkingly rely to behave acceptably” (75-6). 
There is, on Walker’s view, no in principle exclusion of any kind of motivation 
as in and of itself incompatible with “trustworthiness”; nor is it problematic as 
such to understand ‘trust’ as grounded in confidence that the other will meet 
our expectations for purely self-interests reasons.
 In addition to the kind of trust in relationships and interactions in which 
people are “directly aware of each other,” we rely on a “vast web of strangers” 
(75, 73). This highlights an important form of trust—“that unreflective and often 
nonspecific expectation that strangers or unknown others may be relied upon to 
behave in an acceptable and unthreatening manner,” including, or example, trust 
in those “whose actions could harm us through causal chains and over time and 
distance (food processing workers, air traffic controllers)” and those “in various 
roles where, from our point of view, the occupants are replaceable and we are 
relying on them to perform a function (assembly-line workers, airline pilots)” 
(84-5). Walker calls this “diffuse, default trust.” Violations of diffuse, default trust 
can, to be sure, damage, even shatter, our basic sense of safety and control (85, 
92). Yet it is unrealistic, Walker argues, to view them as grounded in goodwill.
 We might wonder why we should view our dependency relationships within 
a “vast web of strangers” as trust relationships rather than ones of (mere) reliance. 
I will reconsider this issue later. Walker appeals to the sense of betrayal and 
indignation we often feel when our default trust is disappointed. This, she claims, 
“is a signal that our reliance is trusting, and that it assumes others’ responsibility 
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and not just their predictability” (85).
 In seeking a “generic” account of trust that can better encompass the array 
of different kinds ‘trust’ relationships we have, Walker attempts to make a 
distinction between reliance that is essentially and exclusively “interpersonal” 
and “the confidence we repose in things (and sometimes people) behaving in 
predictable ways” (79).
 In an intriguing turn, she takes up and applies P.F. Strawson’s distinction 
between the “participant” and “objective attitudes” from which we can, as human 
beings, regard other each other (and ourselves) (Strawson 2005). The “participant 
attitude” characterizes inter-personal relationships in which we “hold ourselves 
and others responsible” (Walker 2006, 104). This is contrasted with the “objective 
attitude” that we typically adopt toward things, and at times toward other people 
when we regard them as “to be managed or handled or cured or trained (Strawson, 
2005, 79). “In the fully objective attitude,” Walker writes, “we regard the wills, 
attitudes, and motives of others entirely as bases of prediction that support our 
own ends for them. In doing so, we cease to treat their relationship either to 
their own ends or to us as one of responsibility, something for which they are 
required to account” (2006, 104-105).
 At the heart of Walker’s “generic” conception of trust is the view that it 
represents a form of reliance we undertake from within the participant attitude. 
In trusting, we rely on others to meet our normative expectations not merely 
confidently predicting they will, but also because we (normatively) expect it of them 
that they will do so “in the awareness (if only implicit or unreflective) that they are liable 
to be held responsible for failing to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so” (2006, 80, 
my emphasis). In trusting, we “stand ready” to hold those we trust accountable 
for fulfilling or disappointing our trust. When our trust is disappointed, we may 
feel betrayed, resentful, indignant. While we can ‘rely on’ things—our vacuum 
cleaner, computer, or winter boots, we do not “hold them responsible” for their 
‘reliability’ in this “interpersonal” sense; we may be frustrated, irritated, fed up, 
but (unless we are viewing them anthropomorphically) we will not see them as 
betraying us, or react to them with resentment and indignation, let alone stand 
ready to “rebuke” them for their “failure”.
 An important virtue Walker claims for her account of trust lies in its “generic” 
character. Trust, as “reliance with responsibility,” is distinguished from (mere) 
reliance of the sort we “repose” in things and, sometimes, in people when we 
regard them from an “objective” perspective. Though our trust in someone might, 
in a particular case, hang on our expectation that they will have goodwill, this 
expectation is part of what we are trusting in, rather than constitutive of trust as 
such: “While I trust my dry cleaner with my clothing, I do not generally expect her 
to perform her tasks with particular concern or regard for me, but with responsibility 
to handle the clothing competently because this is reasonably expected by all 
9
Carse: Trust as Robustly Moral
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2010
Trust as Robustly Moral     11
her customers, of which I am one” (80). In different contexts the bases for our 
confidence that someone will satisfy our expectations can be different.
 Walker is concerned to free her account of trust from an expectation of 
others’ goodwill. An account of trust tied to good will is, she claims, too narrow 
to capture the bulk of trust relationships on which we depend. Trust in others 
might, Walker claims, be grounded in our belief in their “desire to please,” 
“desire of good repute,” “fear of opprobrium or sanctions” or in the “pressure 
of community expectations” (81). Walker contends that there can also be “sad 
or perverse reasons” for trusting people, such as “their abject dependency” or 
their “servility” (Ibid.).
Trust as Robustly Moral: Reflections
In trusting, we hold certain (normative) expectations of another and expect them 
to meet them. Trusting expectations can be more or less conscious and explicit; 
they can also be more or less confident. In cases of thoughtful, explicit trust, we 
project into the future, drawing inferences from what take to be evidence for 
framing our expectations—e.g., “she has never misled me before; I can’t believe 
she’d do so now.” In this respect, trust clearly has cognitive dimensions. But it is 
also an “affectively loaded way of seeing” that “directs our patterns of attention 
and tendencies of interpretation,” shaping how we understand the situations 
we’re in and the others we’re in them with. In this way trust (and distrust) are 
lenses through which we navigate our complex dependencies.
 In the (merely) predictive sense I might ‘depend’ or ‘rely on’ you to finish the 
Sunday crossword puzzle or to cry in sappy movies—to do the things you tend, 
‘reliably,’ to do. But the fact that we can say, ironically, “I can always rely on you 
to forget my birthday” or “to come into the house in muddy shoes” indicates 
that ‘rely on’ (or reliance) can have an honorific meaning—that we take others to 
be “reliable,” not just in being “predictable,” but in predictably doing what we 
hope they will, and believe they should, do. Are all such cases of ‘reliance’ ‘trust’? 
If in trusting, as we have been thinking about it, we hold certain normative 
expectations of another and expect (predictively) that he will meet them, it would 
seem the answer is yes. Yet, as we’ve seen, this is not the answer always given. 
Baier, Jones and Walker each make a case for seeing trust to be a specific form of 
reliance, maintaining that we can (sometimes) rely on others even when we do 
not trust them. While, as we’ve seen, Baier and Jones claim that trust entails an 
expectation that those we trust will have goodwill, Walker seeks to liberate our 
understanding of trust from this expectation, while tying it to responsibility in 
a way reliance in many of its forms need not be tied.
 I want here to turn to some critical reflections, especially about Walker’s 
views, and to locate considerations supporting what I regard as a morally robust 
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notion of trust, one in which a flexible notion of “goodwill” has a central role.
 1. There are, to be sure, many reasons why people meet others’ expectations. 
They can be threatened, manipulated, shamed, or seduced into doing so. They 
may be hungry, too shy to question expectations, or eager to please. They may be 
wily, greedy, and masterful tricksters, driven by ambition but doubtful that they 
can sabotage you without getting caught. Are these, in principle, motivations that 
can ground our trust in others? Walker seems to think so. While she does not 
deny that distinct motivations must in certain cases be part of what we trust in, 
they are not, she claims, a basis for trust as such. There is no in principle exclusion 
of any kind of motivation as in and of itself incompatible with trustworthiness, 
“generically” understood.
 Yet there is something morally troubling, I think, about including someone’s 
predictable desire to please, their fear of “opprobrium,” or their susceptibility to 
the “pressure of community expectations” among the legitimate bases for trusting 
them. Even more troubling is the attachment of “trust” to reliance on someone’s 
“abject dependency” or “servility.” Walker acknowledges that these last two are 
“sad and perverse” grounds for trusting someone (82). But why see them, or any 
of these, as legitimate grounds for trust at all? This is not just a matter of semantics 
(viz., what we want to call ‘trust’). It concerns substantive moral question about 
whether a conception of trust should remain “neutral” regarding motivations, 
whether such a conception can work well in illuminating and addressing moral 
risks carried by our dependencies.
 2. Suppose you rely on me to manage the cash register in your restaurant. 
You have the normative expectation that I will be careful in giving change and 
honest in my transactions with customers, and that I will do so “in the awareness 
(if only implicit or unreflective) that [I am] liable to be held responsible for failing 
to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so” (Walker, 2006, 80). You are also 
confident in expecting (predictively) that I will meet your (normative) expectations. 
Your confidence is grounded in your observation that I am intensely anxious 
about getting fired and hence wish ardently to remain in your good graces. And 
suppose you are right—I am intensely anxious about getting fired and do wish to 
remain in your good graces, and this, rather than responsiveness to the normative 
expectations themselves, is what is motivating me in meeting your expectations.
 What reasons are there for resisting the view that we are in a “trust” relationship? 
Surely there is a concern that, if being honest isn’t in and of itself gripping for me, 
I may have no compunction about stealing from you if I believed I could get away 
with it. This reason highlights a potential downside any time we rely on someone 
because we expect their self-interests and ours to (contingently) coincide. This 
is a real-world, pragmatic challenges of relying on others, and hence of trusting 
them too. While realistic conceptions of trust should be responsive to the risks of 
trusting, they are essentially normative. They take a stand on what should count as 
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trustworthiness, how we should understand trusting as opposed to other forms of 
dependency. They convey views about what we should look for, remember, notice 
and care about in assessing someone’s trustworthiness and in thinking about 
our own. I want here to address what I take to be moral concerns, among other 
things, about a conception of trust that includes as cases of trust cases in which 
we rely primarily on what we take the other to regard as in her self-interest.
 It seems clear that, as your cashier, I’m taking an essentially strategic attitude 
in my relationship with you, one that is oriented to realizing my own end (keeping 
the job). You, in turn, are regarding me strategically in basing your reliance on 
me in your confidence that my fear of losing the job suffices in motivating me 
not to steal.
 This said, it’s true that you may have no inclination at all to threaten or 
manipulate or frighten me into being careful and honest as your cashier. But your 
reliance on me is nonetheless grounded in your (predictive) expectation about 
how I will manage the situation, given my fear and my desire to remain in your 
good graces. In relying on me, you bank on my strategic orientation toward you. 
We are each, therefore, viewing the other through a strategic lens, assessing how 
to realize our own ends (or interests) given the other’s interests as we understand 
them. To echo Walker, we are each regarding each other’s “wills, attitudes, and 
motives … entirely as bases of prediction that support our own ends” (2006, 
105). We are outside the domain of “participation,” of “reciprocity in the plane 
of responsibility” because each of us is taking an essentially “objective” attitude 
toward the other. Thus by Walker’s own lights, we are not, as cashier and owner, 
in a trust relationship.
 This encourages the more general thought that on a consistently Strawsonian 
view, self-interested motivations, such as the desire to please, to avoid sanction, 
to protect one’s reputation—at least insofar as they are decisive rather than just 
in the mix—can ground forms of reliance, but cannot ground trust.
 In occupying the participant stance on Strawson’s own account we “[feel] 
bound or obliged” to do what we should, and correlatively, to react with guilt, 
remorse or even shame when believe we have not done so (2005, 84-85). This 
would support a conception of trust on which it entails an expectation that the 
trusted shares in the feeling of “obligation”—that she sees herself as “bound or 
obliged” to fulfill the normative expectations you trust her to fulfill. Moreover, 
the “participant attitude” is, on Strawson’s own account, inherently mutual. In 
taking a participant attitude toward me, you expect that I take a participant 
attitude toward you. From within the participant perspective, the normative 
expectations involved in both trusting and being trusted, among other things, 
“involve, or express a certain sort of demand for interpersonal regard” (85); 
there are constraints on the kinds of motivations that can ground your trust in 
someone; at the very least they must be compatible with my taking a participant 
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attitude toward you. But if my principal motivation in meeting your expectations 
is to avoid sanctions or further my career, I am oriented strategically with respect 
to you, taking an “objective” rather than partipant’s perspective. Insofar as your 
reliance on me is grounded in your expectation that I will see it is in my strategic 
interest to meet your expectations, you do not trust me. For you are taking an 
essentially strategic attitude toward me. This brings us to reflection about the 
role of “goodwill.”
 3. It is notable that, in rejecting goodwill, Walker writes that though it “might 
be of paramount importance in cases of intimacy and extended relationship—good will 
or regard for the feelings of the particular persons who are trusting in each other—[it] 
may have no role to play in other relationships, or may not play the primary or 
the decisive role” (2006, 77). Expectations of “particular concern and regard for us” 
as the individuals we are is appropriate to “long-standing relationships” but cannot 
be “focus of trust for a stream of daily encounters with unidentifiable individuals” 
(81). This is clearly a different understanding of “goodwill” than that of Baier, 
Jones, or Strawson.
 To take the lead from Baier (who is clearly alluding to Strawson), to act 
with goodwill is to act in a way “incompatible with bad will,” e.g., with cruelty, 
contempt, the desire to see someone humiliated or destroyed. It is also to act in 
a way “incompatible with … indifference,” e.g., with unconcern, dismissiveness, 
blunt inattentiveness. What it is to have goodwill in a positive sense? We can infer 
from the examples Baier and Jones offer that what counts as goodwill for them 
depends on the normative context of trust. While we might expect goodwill in 
the form of “particular concern and regard” in trusting friends and family, the 
goodwill expected of trusted strangers we encounter in library stacks or on the 
bus might consist in respect for “our valued autonomy” expressed in “leav[ing 
us] alone (Baier, 1994a, 103). A sense of reciprocity or fair play might constitute 
goodwill among team members, candidates for political office (trustworthy ones), 
or spouses. While acting with goodwill is distinct from acting with bad will or 
indifference, just what in particular it amounts to is keyed to the normative 
expectations the trusted is being relied on to meet.
 Goodwill, so understood, need play no less a role in the “stream of 
daily encounters with unidentified individuals,” than in our “long-standing 
relationships” and “intimac[ies].” 
 Strawson writes: “We should think of the many different kinds of relationship 
which we can have with other people – as sharers of a common interests; as 
members of the same family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance parties 
to an enormous range of transactions and encounters …. In general, we demand 
some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships 
to us, though the forms we require it to take vary widely in different connections. The 
range and intensity of our reactive attitudes towards goodwill, its absence or its 
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opposite vary no less widely” (2005, 78-79, my emphasis). While “goodwill” may 
take many forms, the concept is not a no-holds-barred placeholder for any attitude 
or motivation one might have. It must be an attitude or motivation expressing 
(or evincing) due regard for others in the normative context at issue.
 4. If we wish to account for trust in a wide range of relationships and 
interactions, we need to consider how a moralized understanding of trust might 
apply to them. This brings us to rude waiters, incommunicative airline employees 
and negligent police officers. Walker writes: “We may resent rude treatment by a 
waiter but we may also resent generally bad service on an airline when schedules 
are disrupted and information is unavailable or confusing. In the latter case 
the lapses are not directed at us, nor do we necessarily know whom we blame; 
individual employees are likely to be exposed to the indignation of the unhappy 
customer who feels irresponsibly served .… Crime victims may become furious 
at responding police officers who were “supposed to protect them” … this reveals 
a tacit (and often unrealistic) reliance on unknown others who are believed to 
have responsibility for keeping public order” (2006, 85-6).
 Walker is suggesting that the fact that we do sometimes feel betrayed by, 
and indignant toward, airline employees and police officers when we experience 
them as falling short of our expectations indicates that it is our trust, rather 
than just our reliance, that is disappointed. But the kind of trust we place in 
them, as “unknown others” on whom we depend, cannot realistically entail an 
expectation that they will have goodwill toward us. Nor can we expect them 
to respond directly and favorably to the fact that we are counting on them. In 
trusting them, she says, we rely on them to meet normative expectations—e.g., 
to provide “good service” or to “keep the public order,” and to do so with the 
awareness that they are being expected, and held accountable for, doing so.
 Let’s start with the waiter. We may, to be sure, regard a waiter’s rudeness as 
compounding a disappointing evening. Along with the loud background noise, the 
long wait for a table, the salty food, it may leave us feeling annoyed or disgusted. 
But we might, additionally react to the waiter’s rudeness with resentment or 
indignation. We may, that is, hold him accountable for his failings. He has, after 
all, fallen short of meeting the normative expectations of him as a waiter that 
he be gracious and polite to diners at the restaurant. But does this short-falling 
alone account for a reaction of resentment or indignation? I want to suggest that 
in reacting to the waiter’s rudeness with resentment or indignation, we see his 
failure—his rudeness—not only as a normative failing, but as a normative failing 
that is demeaning of us.
 Of course, Walker is saying that in many cases—in contrast to the case of the 
waiter—those we trust (or distrust) cannot be expected to have any specific kind 
of regard for us at all. We are nameless, faceless others for them, as they are for 
us. But while we are not “faceless” for the waiter, we may well be “nameless”—
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that is, we may stand in a role-defined relationship to him, in which what is 
morally salient is not our individuality in its particularities, but the fact that we 
are customers. And as a waiter, one has normative responsibilities to customers, 
which our waiter failed to meet in being rude.
 Surely, when as airline passengers we feel indignant and resentful in confronting 
lousy service, upset schedules, or poor communication from airline employees, 
we are not just annoyed or frustrated by a maddening situation; we are seeing 
the lousy service as a form of disregard. But we need not be reacting first and 
foremost to what we see as disregard for us as the particular individuals we are. 
We may feel we are being herded like cows, and experience the airline personnel 
as managing, manipulating, or—if we are lucky—assuaging us, regarding us more 
like things to be dealt with than as passengers who are people (despite the smiling 
faces in the ads and billboards inviting our trust).
 Similarly, the failure of the police to “keep public order” may evoke 
indignation and resentment from crime victims (and others), not because the 
failure is seen as a personal affront or rebuff, but because it is seen to reveal a 
dismissive, disrespectful attitude toward those the protesters represent—in this 
case, perhaps, toward certain groups of citizens who rightly count on the police to 
value and pursue their safety yet feel their safety is not being sufficiently valued 
and protected.
 Trust, even in relatively impersonal dependencies, is tied to the general 
expectation that those trusted will meet their responsibilities (satisfy normative 
expectations) among which is the responsibility to treat us with good will, with due 
regard—sometimes as the particular individuals we are, sometimes as occupants of 
a role, but always as people. What counts as “due regard,” is tied to the relational 
contexts, including the roles we occupy in relationship to one another; it is 
normative matter on which we often disagree. Part of trusting is that we rely on 
those we trust to share our understanding of the norms governing the domain 
of our trust. Finding out that they don’t may well be cause to cease trusting, to 
shift to a more vigilant, wary stance if we continue to rely on others at all.
Conclusion
Perhaps, if we are realistic, we should conclude that we must simply settle for 
(mere) reliance in many, even most, of our dependency relationships, especially 
those within the vast web of dependencies on others who remain faceless and 
nameless. Maybe this isn’t so bad. As Jones points out, “trust and distrust are 
contraries but not contradictories. One may fail to trust without actively distrusting 
… [I]n between trust and distrust are found various forms of relying on and taking 
for granted which are not grounded in either optimism or pessimism about the 
other’s goodwill” (16). The absence of trust, that is, does not entail distrust. Yet, 
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I would hope that achieving (mere) reliance would not define our aspirations.
 We are, as people, creatures with dignitary vulnerability. We should be realistic 
about how much “we actually mind, how much it matters to us,” as Strawson puts 
it so eloquently, “whether the actions of other people … reflect attitudes towards 
us of goodwill … on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence 
on the other” (2005, 76). All of us must live with conflicting expectations and 
pressures from others. And it is a brute reality that meeting the expectations 
of those who trust us can require making practical compromises and decisions 
that will disappoint them. In trusting, we have confidence that our interests or 
needs will not be forsaken too easily or for the wrong reasons by those we trust. 
This doesn’t, as noted earlier, entail an expectation that our interests and needs 
will, as such, be decisive for those we trust, but it does entail optimism that 
they will be given appropriate significance and weight. The diverse, and often 
complex, nature of our actual dependency relationships can make judgments 
about what counts appropriate significance and weight challenging, and subject 
to disagreement. But this is an important challenge to take on, to grapple with, 
in assessing the moral health of our dependencies. It is also a challenge that 
brings with it some of the moral risks of trust, especially in those relationships 
in which trust is most valuable. In the robustly moral sense, trust is tied to the 
expectation, whether explicit or peacefully presumed, articulate or inchoate, that 
we will not, in depending on others, regard them in merely instrumental terms, 
and that those on whom we depend will, likewise, show due regard for us.
  Georgetown University
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Notes
1  I wish to express thanks for the lively discussion of trust during my visit to 
SUNY Brockport, from which I learned a great deal. Special gratitude goes to 
Georges Dicker, for his hospitality, his keen reflections about trust (including 
self-trust) and his remarkable graciousness.
2  We also wonder sometimes whether we can trust ourselves. Self-trust raises 
important and fascinating questions in its own right, which are outside the 
scope of my discussion here.
3  See for example Luhmann (1980); Hardin (2002, 2008), Walker (2006), Jones 
(1996). See Walker (2006) and Jones (2004) for accounts of varieties of trust 
they claim are ill-suited to three-place analysis.
4  See Margaret Walker (2006) for an excellent discussion of the distinction 
between “predictive” and “normative” expectations in the context of trust.
5  In her essay, “Trust and Terror” (2004) Jones herself comes to the view that 
a focus on goodwill is “too restrictive” to capture trust in all its varieties, in 
particular, what she calls “basal trust,” or a fundamental sense of safety in the 
world. 
6  The rejection of goodwill-based accounts of trust is widely shared in recent 
accounts of trust. See, for example, Pettit (1995) and Hardin (2008).
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